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INTRODUCTION

In the age of the Internet, students’ free-speech rights are in
peril. Students still “talk” to one another, but they are just as likely
to e-mail, text, instant message, blog, status update, and tweet their
1
speech. And while students have caught up to the technology, the
judiciary has not. The U.S. Supreme Court has drawn clear lines
2
for the First Amendment rights of secondary students while they
physically are in classrooms, but so far it has failed to give
cyberspeech the analysis and protection it requires. In the absence
of clear judicial standards for student speech that has increasingly
moved online, this issue has emerged in the lower courts in the
3
context of K-12 schools. In due time, the Supreme Court likely
1. According to a 2009 survey by the Pew Research Center, ninety-three
percent of American teens use the Internet, with seventy-three percent using social
networking sites like Facebook and Myspace, and thirty-seven percent sharing
their own creations, like art, stories, or videos. Trend Data For Teens, PEW INTERNET
& AM. LIFE PROJECT, http://www.pewinternet.org/Trend-Data-for-Teens/OnlineActivites-Total.aspx (last updated May 2011). The survey also found that seventyfive percent of teens had a mobile phone, and sixty-nine percent owned laptop or
personal computers. Teen Gadget Ownership, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT,
http://www.pewinternet.org/Trend-Data-for-Teens/Teen-Gadget-Ownership.aspx
(last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
2. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. An Indiana federal district court judge noted that such issues are “ripe for
disposition” in an August 2011 case regarding online student speech. T.V. ex rel.
B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:09-CV-290-PPS, 2011 WL 3501698, at
*1 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2011). The conflict that Chief Judge Simon sets up is
typical of many of the controversies to be discussed:
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will determine how far, if at all, a school’s jurisdiction extends to
online student speech. In 2011, the Court denied three writs of
4
Nevertheless, the
certiorari in online student-speech cases.
increased scrutiny may perhaps raise the likelihood that the high
court at some point will clarify how far a school’s authority extends
to off-campus, online speech.
A tension has arisen between protecting students’ freedom of
speech and shielding schools from real and perceived threats of
student violence. This is particularly apparent against the deadly
5
backdrop of the fatal shooting sprees at Virginia Tech, the Red
6
7
Lake reservation, and Columbine High School. But in attempting
to safeguard campuses, some courts and school administrators have
overreached in their restriction of student speech, particularly
when it is online and off-campus.
This unfortunate tendency is illustrated in the recent decision
8
of Tatro v. University of Minnesota, in which the Minnesota Court of

Id.

The case poses timely questions about the limits school officials can place
on out of school speech by students in the information age where
Twitter, Facebook, MySpace, texts, and the like rule the day. The school
argues that they ought to be allowed to regulate this speech while the
students claim that their First Amendment rights are being violated.

4. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Doninger v. Niehoff,
642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011).
5. On April 16, 2007, student Seung-Hui Cho opened fire in classrooms and
a dormitory at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, killing thirty-two
people and wounding twenty-five others before taking his own life; the massacre
was the deadliest mass shooting in U.S. history. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics
/organizations/v/virginia_polytechnic_institute_and_state_university/index.html
(last updated Mar. 14, 2012).
6. On March, 21, 2005, on the northern Minnesota Indian reservation of
Red Lake, sixteen-year-old Jeff Weise shot his grandfather to death and then went
to the high school, where he shot students and teachers at random. What
Happened at Red Lake?, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 2005), http://news.minnesota
.publicradio.org/projects/2005/03/redlake/. Ten died and seven others were
injured. Id.
7. “On the morning of April 20, 1999, Eric Harris, 18, and Dylan Klebold,
17, walked into Columbine High School, outside Denver, and shot to death 12
fellow students and a teacher” before killing themselves. Gina Lamb, Columbine
High School, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics
/organizations/c/columbine_high_school/index.html (last updated Apr. 17,
2008). “Their actions were the result of a yearlong plot that included plans to
blow up the school and kill as many as 500 people.” Id.
8. 800 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
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Appeals upheld the university’s discipline of a student for her
9
10
online, off-campus speech. In Tatro, a three-judge panel of the
appeals court held that school administrators did not violate the
First Amendment rights of mortuary-science student Amanda Tatro
when they disciplined her for her off-color Facebook status
11
Tatro’s Facebook comments, which she has claimed
updates.
12
were satirical, referenced her desire to “stab a certain someone in
13
the throat” with a cadaver lab instrument.
Tatro’s ruling represents an overly broad judicial reach and is
troubling for student speech.
The decision allows school
administrators far too much leeway in limiting student speech
online. Equally troubling, it also wrongly equates high school and
university speech standards. Fortunately, the Minnesota Supreme
Court agreed in 2011 to take Tatro’s appeal, and heard oral
arguments on February 8, 2012. At the time of this writing, a
decision in the case had not been published. The state’s highest
court should overturn this flawed decision. If left to stand, Tatro’s
disquieting logic could have a chilling effect on the freedom of
student expression and could encourage post-secondary educators
to treat speech that is merely critical as threatening.
Part II of this article traces the history of the U.S. Supreme
14
Part III details
Court’s analysis of students’ free-speech rights.
15
This article posits
Tatro’s controversial holding and reasoning.
that the Minnesota Court of Appeals wrongly decided Tatro on four
distinct grounds.
Part IV examines the first of these four areas: the improper
16
application of the so-called Tinker standard to a university
17
The Tinker standard allows school officials to sanction
setting.
student speech if they reasonably conclude that the speech will
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
18
This standard should be restricted to K–12 student
school.”
speech, not extended to adults at the post-secondary level.
9.
10.
panel.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 813–14.
Judges Bjorkman, Halbrooks, and Hudson sat on the Court of Appeals
Id. at 822–23.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 817.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
See infra Part IV.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
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Part V argues that even if Tinker were the proper lens through
which to view Tatro, Tinker should not be applied to this type of off19
campus speech. Tatro’s online speech was off-campus speech that
did not occur at a school-sponsored event, and as such, it amounts
to protected conduct under the rubric of school-speech cases. Part
VI explains that even if Tinker should apply to college-level, off20
campus speech, the substantial-disruption standard was unmet.
The result of Tatro’s speech does not qualify as a “substantial
disruption” under Tinker or its progeny. Part VII discusses the final
21
way that the court of appeals erred in its reasoning. The court
22
should have applied the “true-threat” standard, instead of the
Tinker standard, to determine if Tatro’s speech was protected. The
First Amendment does not shield true threats, but this article
suggests that Tatro’s online comments clearly did not amount to
true threats. The Facebook posts, while in bad taste, could not
reasonably have been seen as a true threat to a particular
individual, or to her classmates more generally.
Finally, Part VIII analyzes the potential ramifications of the
decision for students in the age of social media, particularly in
lowering the threshold for speech to “materially and substantially
23
disrupt the work and discipline of the school.” It then urges the
Minnesota Supreme Court to overturn the appeals court’s ruling
and safeguard student-speech protections.
II. HISTORY OF STUDENT-SPEECH PROTECTIONS
To properly analyze Tatro and the progeny of cases it purports
to follow, it is critical to examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence around student speech. In the tetralogy of student
speech cases, there are two important ambiguities. First, none of
the cases involved college students, and the Court has not expressly
extended its more deferential standards for high school speech
restrictions to universities. The second unaddressed issue is how
far off campus, if at all, a school’s jurisdiction extends over student
19. See infra Part V.
20. See infra Part VI.
21. See infra Part VII.
22. Under a true-threat analysis, “statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals” are not protected
under the First Amendment. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344, 359 (2003).
23. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513; see infra Part VIII.
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speech.
The seminal case on student speech came in 1969, with Tinker
24
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. The majority’s
25
7-2 decision held that the First Amendment applied to students in
public schools and that administrators would have to demonstrate
constitutionally valid reasons for any specific regulation of speech
26
in the classroom. The court affirmed: “It can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
27
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” But
while the First Amendment conclusively protects the free-speech
rights of students in school, those rights must be “applied in light
28
The
of the special characteristics of the school environment.”
Tinker court held that “to justify prohibition of a particular
expression of opinion,” school officials must prove that “the
forbidden conduct would materially and substantially interfere with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
29
The Court determined that Des Moines junior and
school.”
senior high students who wore black armbands to school in a silent,
passive protest of the Vietnam War did not cause a substantial
disruption to educational activities, and therefore, the students’
30
speech was protected. In order to justify the prohibition of an
expression, the Court noted that “[school officials] must be able to
show that [their] action was caused by something more than a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
31
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”
Lower courts have interpreted Tinker to mean that school
authorities are not obligated to wait until an actual disruption
occurs, but can regulate student expression if they can reasonably
32
forecast that a disruption will occur. The Sixth Circuit noted that
“[s]chool officials have an affirmative duty to not only ameliorate
the harmful effects of disruptions, but to prevent them from

24. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
25. Justice Abe Fortas authored the landmark Tinker opinion. Id.
26. Id. at 511.
27. Id. at 506.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 509.
30. Id. at 508–09.
31. Id. at 509.
32. Id. at 514 (stating that speech cannot be restricted if the record fails to
“demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities”).
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33

happening in the first place.”
Tinker and its “substantial-disruption” test set the broad and
general rule for when school speech may be regulated, and a trio of
subsequent cases have whittled away at Tinker’s protection, carving
out narrow exceptions to its test. The first exception came in Bethel
34
School District v. Fraser, which held that school officials are
permitted to regulate “lewd,” “vulgar,” and “indecent” speech at
35
school. The Court held that the discipline of Bethel High School
student Matthew Fraser, who was suspended after giving a speech
filled with sexual innuendos at a school assembly, did not violate
36
the First Amendment. The Court determined that the rights of
students “are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults
in other settings” and that “[t]he determination of what manner of
speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate
37
By not employing the
properly rests with the school board.”
“substantial-disruption” test, Fraser established that “the mode of
38
analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.”
The second exception to Tinker was addressed in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, in which the Court held that school
officials are allowed to impose reasonable restrictions on school39
sponsored publications. The Court determined that a Missouri
high school principal who removed articles on divorce and teen
pregnancy from a school-sponsored newspaper did not violate the
40
“[E]ducators do not offend the First
First Amendment.
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities
so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
41
pedagogical concerns.”
The final narrowing of Tinker came in Morse v. Frederick, where
the issue was whether school administrators violated the freespeech rights of Juneau-Douglas High School student Joseph
42
Frederick. Frederick had displayed a banner that read “BONG
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007).
478 U.S. 675, 683, 685 (1986).
Id. at 685.
Id. at 685–86.
Id. at 682–83.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007).
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
Id. at 276.
Id. at 273.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 396.
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HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school-sanctioned and supervised event held
across the street from the school during the 2002 Olympic Torch
43
Relay. The Court held that “a principal may, consistent with the
First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when
44
that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”
The Court declined to apply the Tinker standard, noting that
45
neither Hazelwood nor Frazer did. In concluding the speech was
not protected, the Court noted the “serious and palpable” danger
46
that drug use poses to the health and safety of students. While
Frederick was off-campus, the Court emphasized that school events
and field trips off school grounds were subject to the school’s rules
47
of conduct.
Therefore, under Fraser, a school may prohibit lewd, vulgar, or
profane language on school property or at school-sanctioned
48
events. Under Hazelwood, a school may regulate school-sponsored
49
speech on the basis of any legitimate pedagogical concern.
Under Morse, a school may regulate speech that poses a direct
50
threat to the safety of students. “Speech falling outside of these
categories is subject to Tinker’s general rule: it may be regulated
only if it would substantially disrupt school operations or interfere
51
with the right of others.”

43. Id. at 397.
44. Id. at 403.
45. Id. at 405–06.
46. Id. at 408; see Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 769 (5th
Cir. 2007). The Ponce court held that, based on Morse, school administrators do
not need to “evaluate the potential for disruption caused by speech advocating
drug use; it is per se unprotected because of the scope of the harm it potentially
foments.” Id. The court held that disciplinary action against a student who kept
an extended notebook diary, in which he detailed his Nazi-like group plan to
shoot up the high school, did not violate his First Amendment rights. Id. at 766.
This is because this speech “pose[d] a direct threat to the physical safety of the
school population.” Id.
47. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401–02.
48. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
49. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
50. Morse, 551 U.S. at 410.
51. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001).
Tinker mandates that there be a “specific and significant fear of disruption, not just
some remote apprehension of disturbance.” Id. at 211.
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III. TATRO V. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
The circumstances surrounding Tatro could have been lifted
52
from HBO’s dark drama, Six Feet Under. Tatro was enrolled in the
University of Minnesota’s undergraduate mortuary-science
53
program. The program prepares students to be funeral directors
or morticians, and its required laboratory classes include anatomy,
54
The lab courses use cadavers
embalming, and restorative art.
55
donated through the university’s anatomy-bequest program.
Tatro attended an orientation program that discussed appropriate
conduct toward the cadavers and signed a disclosure form
indicating that she understood and would follow the program
56
rules.
She posted status updates on her Facebook page in November
and December 2009, making comments such as, “Give me room,
57
lots of aggression to be taken out with a trocar.” She referred to
58
the cadaver she was practicing on at the university lab as “Bernie.”
Another post read: “Who knew embalming lab was so cathartic! I
still want to stab a certain someone in the throat with a trocar
though. Hmm. . .[sic] perhaps I will spend the evening updating
my ‘Death List # 5’ and making friends with the crematory guy. I
59
do know the codeFalse[sic].” Tatro’s settings allowed her posts to
be viewed by “friends” and “friends of friends,” a group that

52. Six Feet Under was a television drama that was broadcast on the cable
network HBO from 2001–2005. The award-winning series detailed the lives of the
Fisher family, an eccentric clan, who operated a funeral home. Six Feet Under:
About the Show, HBO, http://www.hbo.com/six-feet-under/index.html#/six-feetunder/about/index.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). It won nine Emmy Awards,
three Screen Actors Guild Awards, three Golden Globe Awards, and a Peabody
Award. Awards for “Six Feet Under,” IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0248654
/awards (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
53. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. “A trocar is an instrument used during embalming that has a long
hollow needle with a sharp end, used to aspirate fluids and gases out of the body.”
Id. at 814 n.3.
58. Id. at 814. Weekend at Bernie’s is a 1989 film starring Andrew McCarthy,
Jonathan Silverman, and Catherine Mary Stewart. Weekend at Bernie’s, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0098627 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). The comedy’s
plot involves two young men who pretend their murdered boss is still alive as a
“frustrated hit man” continues to try to kill him. Id.
59. Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 814.
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60

included hundreds of people. A student reported concerns about
61
the postings to university officials. The director of the mortuaryscience program contacted university police on December 14,
62
After police
2009, and told Tatro not to return to class.
concluded she had not committed a crime, she was allowed to
63
return to class a few days later.
The university’s Office for Student Conduct and Academic
Integrity submitted a formal complaint against Tatro on December
29, 2009, alleging violations of the university’s student-conduct
64
code. The complaint alleged that she “engaged in threatening,
harassing, or assaultive conduct . . . [and] in conduct contrary to
university rules related to the mortuary-science program, anatomylaboratory course rules, and the rules listed on the anatomy65
bequest-program disclosure form.”
A panel of the Campus Committee on Student Behavior
66
(CCSB) held a hearing in March 2010. In April of that year, the
CCSB issued a written decision, finding Tatro responsible for the
violations and imposing several sanctions, including a failing grade
in her anatomy-laboratory course and academic probation for the
67
Tatro appealed the
duration of her undergraduate career.
decision to the provost’s appeal committee (PAC), which upheld
68
The appellate court
the CCSB’s findings and sanctions.
considered four issues in taking her appeal, including whether the
69
university’s sanctions violated her constitutional rights.
60. Id. Facebook describes its privacy settings this way:
When you select an audience for your friend list, you are only controlling
who can see it on your profile. We call this a profile visibility control . . . .
For example, if you select “Only Me” as the audience for your friend list,
but your friend sets her friend list to “Public,” anyone will be able to see
your connection on your friend’s profile.
Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-infoon-fb#controlprofile (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
61. Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 814.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 814–15.
65. Id. at 815.
66. Id.
67. Id. Tatro also was required to enroll in a clinical ethics course, write a
letter to mortuary-science department faculty addressing the issue of respect
within the department and profession, and complete a psychiatric evaluation. Id.
68. Id. The provost issued a final decision, which referred to Tatro’s
Facebook posts as ‘“disrespectful, unprofessional, and reasonably interpreted as
threatening.”‘ Id.
69. Id. The other issues Tatro unsuccessfully argued on appeal were that: (1)
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Tatro framed the constitutional argument in two ways. She
argued first that the Tinker standard does not apply in a university
70
setting. She further argued that the university could only limit
71
speech under the true-threat doctrine. In writing for the appeals
72
court panel, Judge Bjorkman flatly rejected these arguments and
squarely invoked Tinker, holding that “Tatro’s Facebook posts
materially and substantially disrupted the work and discipline of
the university,” and therefore, the university did not violate her
73
First Amendment rights by disciplining her.
IV. THE TINKER TEST SHOULD NOT APPLY TO PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
A. Tinker Invoked, But Not Applied
The Supreme Court has not yet held explicitly that Tinker or its
progeny do not apply to college speech, but the Court also has
never applied Tinker in a post-secondary-speech case. The Supreme
Court has, however, referenced the line of cases as it laid out the
framework of student-speech protections in college cases. This lack
of express guidance has left the federal circuits split to some degree
in interpreting the free-speech rights of post-secondary students.
In Healy v. James, the Supreme Court’s first college speech case
(decided just three years after Tinker), the Court began its
discussion by quoting the language of Tinker: “First Amendment
rights must always be applied ‘in light of the special characteristics
74
However, the Healy Court
of the [school] environment . . . .’”
immediately took a step back: “Yet, the precedents of this Court
leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need
for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less
75
force on college campuses than in the community at large.”
the university did not have the authority to conduct the disciplinary hearing
because the student code of conduct did not apply to off-campus conduct and
course-specific rules are not covered by the code; (2) the university lacked
evidence to support the determination that Tatro violated university rules; and (3)
the university did not have the authority to change Tatro’s course grades as a
sanction. Id.
70. Relator’s Brief and Addendum at 34–38, Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800
N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (No. A10-1440), 2010 WL 7131428 at *34–38.
71. Id.
72. Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 821.
73. Id. at 822.
74. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
75. Id.
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While the Court was willing to nod to Tinker, it was not willing to
apply it.
The Court itself explicitly acknowledged this tension. In a
Hazelwood footnote, for instance, the Court refused to determine
whether the regulations it applied to high school students should
76
carry over to college students. Justice Souter, in his 2000 Board of
Regents v. Southworth concurrence, wrote: “[Our] cases dealing with
the right of teaching institutions to limit expressive freedom of
students have been confined to high schools . . . whose students
and their schools’ relation to them are different and at least
arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college
77
education.”
B. Differing Pedagogies
A more deferential view of college-student speech is
appropriate, given the vast difference between the student bodies
and the educational missions of secondary and post-secondary
institutions. Students enrolled at public universities should have a
greater degree of free-speech protections than high school and
junior high students. There is a glaring disparity in imposing the
same restrictions on twenty-two-year-olds as on twelve-year-olds.
The students have widely different levels of emotional maturity and
78
brain development.
Perhaps more importantly, the pedagogies for these different
ages are vastly different. Lower-level schools aim to teach collective
values and mores, molding young people into productive members
of society. Indeed, discipline is an educational component of
primary and secondary schools. The Fraser Court emphasized this
necessity:
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in
public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum,
and the civics class; schools must teach by example the
76. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988) (“We
need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with
respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university
level.”).
77. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 238 n.4 (2000) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
78. See Richard Knox, The Teen Brain: It’s Just Not Grown Up Yet, NPR (Mar. 1,
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124119468
(explaining that recent studies have shown that human brains develop based on
levels of myelin, a “fatty coating” that allows “nerve signals to flow freely”).
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shared values of a civilized social order. . . . [T]eachers—
and indeed the older students—[must] demonstrate the
appropriate form of civil discourse and political
expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of
79
class.
Elementary and high school education, thereby, is a mandatory
system that seeks to inculcate students with collective principles of
society and to protect impressionable minds from sensitive
material.
Colleges and universities, on the other hand, serve as entirely
voluntary endeavors for their students, most of whom are legal
adults. Universities aim to better society and encourage intellectual
growth. The goal is to promote freedom of thought, to expose
students to myriad viewpoints, and to encourage deep inquiry into
the world. Justice Brennan famously wrote that “the classroom is
peculiarly the marketplace of ideas,” and the significance of
safeguarding academic freedom in American society cannot be
80
As one scholar suggests, the Court’s own
overestimated.
descriptions of universities, which have emphasized an “unbridled
dialogue as an essential component of the academic endeavor,
stand [. . .] in sharp contrast to the functions the Court has
assigned to primary and secondary schools, which are to keep
81
students safe and cultivate their moral and civic character.”
Equating primary school speech with college speech wrongly
negates these distinctions. University students have discrete rights
that younger students do not. There is not the strict control over
82
students via an in loco parentis relationship. College professors and
79. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
80. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Justice Brennan wrote that academic freedom “is of transcendent
value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.” Id. He further quoted from
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, in which the Court held, “Scholarship cannot flourish in
an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.” 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957).
81. Kelly Sarabyn, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Resolving the Federal Circuit Split
Over College Students’ First Amendment Rights, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 27, 28 (2008).
82. In loco parentis, Latin for “in the place of a parent,” is defined as, “[o]f,
relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on all
or some of the responsibilities of a parent. The Supreme Court has recognized
that during the school day, an elementary or high school teacher or administrator
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administrators do not stand in for students’ parents. Therefore,
the in loco parentis relationship that elementary, middle, and high
schools have with students, and that can justify restricting speech
that undercuts the values that those schools are trying to
indoctrinate, cannot justify such restrictions at the college level.
College students are adults and should enjoy the same broad swath
of First Amendment protections at school as they would in any
other setting.
C. U.S. Supreme Court Precedents Protect College Speech
In fact, the Supreme Court has never upheld a student-speech
restriction at the university level.
The significance of this
jurisprudence is underscored by the Court’s approach to speech
concerns at the primary school level. Indeed, the post-secondary
cases’ outcomes stand in opposition to the Court’s history on
restraining secondary-student speech. After Tinker, it sustained the
84
speech restriction in every subsequent case. But the Court has
ruled for students in five cases addressing university students’
85
speech. Four involved the funding of student groups on campus,
and one involved a student who distributed a newspaper on
86
campus.
While the facts in those cases are admittedly dissimilar from
Tatro, what is crucial is the level of deference the Court repeatedly
has afforded to the protection of college-level speech. It has not
linked high school- and college-speech rights. The Court made
may act in loco parentis.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 858 (9th ed. 2009) (citing
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)).
83. See David L. Hudson Jr., Cyberspeech, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Apr. 9,
2002, updated Aug. 2008), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/cyberspeech.
The author explains that some commentators and courts “argue that school
officials do not have jurisdiction over student Internet expression that takes place
off campus. The matter would be one for parental, not school, discipline, they
argue.” Id. Hudson notes that former First Amendment Center Executive
Director Ken Paulson has written: ‘“There is no legal justification for censoring a
student’s expression in the privacy of his home.’” Id.
84. See Sarabyn, supra note 81, at 41. The author argues that this contrast
“speaks strongly in support of a sharp distinction between student speech at a
secondary school and student speech at a university.” Id.
85. The cases are: Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Papish v.
Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); and Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169 (1972).
86. See cases cited supra note 85.
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clear in Healy that “state colleges and universities are not enclaves
87
immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.” Rather, the
Court noted, when the need for university students to work in an
atmosphere free of disruption competes with the interest for
students to have freedom of expression, “the First Amendment,
made binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, strikes
88
the required balance.”
One year after Healy, in Papish v. Board of Curators of the
University of Missouri, the Court again affirmed this principle,
holding that “Healy makes it clear that the mere dissemination of
ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state university
campus may not be shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of
89
decency.’” The Papish Court determined that a political cartoon,
depicting policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and a newspaper
article entitled “M—f— Acquitted,” were not constitutionally
90
obscene or unprotected speech.
D. Circuits Fractured; Third Circuit Decisions Get it Right
In the absence of explicit guidance from the Supreme Court,
the federal circuits have developed contradictory standards
concerning the First Amendment rights of college students during
the past thirty-some years. But two recent decisions, both in the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have analyzed the issue from the
proper perspective and strengthened the broad rights afforded to
91
college students. In the 2008 case of DeJohn v. Temple University,
92
and again two years later in McCauley v. University of Virgin Islands,
the Third Circuit affirmed that greater speech protections are
93
afforded to students at public universities than in primary schools.
To varying degrees, other circuits also have been reluctant to
apply a secondary standard to post-secondary speech. The First,
Second, and Sixth Circuits have granted greater speech protections
94
The First Circuit unequivocally asserted
to university students.
87. 408 U.S. at 180 (holding that the non-recognition of a student group at
Central Connecticut State College stifled the exercise of the group’s First
Amendment rights).
88. Id. at 171.
89. 410 U.S. at 668.
90. Id. at 670.
91. 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008).
92. 618 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2010).
93. Id. at 242; DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315.
94. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 352 (6th Cir. 2001). The court held
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that Hazelwood “is not applicable to college newspapers.”
The
remaining circuits, on the other hand, have unfortunately applied
a more deferential standard for post-secondary speech. The
Eleventh Circuit, for instance, analyzed a college-speech case
directly under the rubric of the Tinker line of cases, implicitly
adopting the rule that college and high school students have the
96
same First Amendment rights. The Tenth Circuit followed suit
97
and directly applied a high school standard. The Fifth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits have applied secondary standards to universities
98
99
in a more “piecemeal” fashion, however.
that administrators could not withhold publication of a Kentucky State University
yearbook for being inappropriate and of poor quality. Id. at 356–57. The court
did not reject secondary standards outright, however. See id. at 346 n.5; see also
Husain v. Springer, 494 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a public college
president’s decision to cancel a student government election because of content
published in the school newspaper violates the First Amendment rights of the
student journalists).
95. Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989).
There is one Eighth Circuit college-speech decision—albeit twenty-nine years
old—that affirmed full First Amendment protection to University of Minnesota
students. In Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983), the appeals court
held that a university cannot withhold funding for a student newspaper because it
does not like the content. “A public university may not constitutionally take
adverse action against a student newspaper, such as withdrawing or reducing the
paper’s funding, because it disapproves of the content of the paper.” Id. at 282.
Nowhere in Stanley did the court invoke Tinker.
96. Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n of Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344,
1347 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that regulations which banned and limited the
distribution of campus literature before an election were reasonably related to the
university’s legitimate interest in “minimiz[ing] the disruptive effect of campus
electioneering”).
97. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004). A Mormon
acting student at the University of Utah sued the school after determining that her
refusal to use swear words during classroom acting exercises would force her to
leave the program. Id. at 1283. The court found that the classroom was a
nonpublic forum and that the student’s speech constituted “school-sponsored
speech” and was governed by Hazelwood. Id. at 1285.
98. See Sarabyn, supra note 81, at 47. The author analyzes the three circuit
approaches and concludes that while they fall short of the “direct-application
approach” employed by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, they have applied the
standards in a “confused, piecemeal fashion.” Id.
99. The Seventh Circuit, in Hosty v. Carter, employed a narrow view of the
protections afforded to student publications at public universities. 412 F.3d 731
(7th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Hosty held that the same standard that governs
censorship of student speech in primary and secondary schools also applies to
speech in colleges and universities. Id. at 735. In response, the Illinois legislature
passed the Campus Press Act, which took effect in 2008 and designated student
publications as public forums that are free from censorship. 110 ILL COMP. STAT.
13/1–13/97 (2011); Moore v. Watson, 738 F. Supp. 2d 817, 831 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
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But in justifying its application of Tinker to student speech on
100
college campuses, the Tatro court only quoted the Third Circuit,
101
a circuit that recognizes a need for “caution” in applying Tinker.
Tatro misinterpreted DeJohn and wrongly asserted that the Third
Circuit analyzed a university’s speech policy for overbreadth under
102
To the contrary, DeJohn took pains to
the framework of Tinker.
show that simply applying a secondary-speech framework to a
university setting is insufficient, because university “administrators
103
are granted less leeway in regulating student speech.”
In DeJohn, the Third Circuit found that the sexual harassment
policy at Temple University was facially unconstitutional because it
104
It determined that the policy could have a
was overbroad.
105
The DeJohn
chilling effect on speech related to gender issues.
court went on to hold that a secondary school’s ability to restrict
certain speech does not mean that public colleges could restrict the
106
same speech. The court further noted that:
Discussion by adult students in a college classroom should
not be restricted. Certain speech, however, which cannot
be prohibited to adults may be prohibited to public
elementary and high school students. This is particularly
true when considering that public elementary and high
school administrators have the unique responsibility to act
107
in loco parentis.
In McCauley, the Third Circuit further delineated the
differences between the free-speech rights afforded to secondary
108
It again struck down speech codes,
and post-secondary students.
this time a section of the harassment policy at the University of the
109
It reaffirmed the rule from DeJohn that public
Virgin Islands.
colleges and universities have “significantly less leeway in regulating
100. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
101. DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 318 (3d Cir. 2008).
102. In fact, DeJohn actually employed the overbreadth analysis it used in Saxe
v. State College Area School District, 240 F.3d 200, 214 (2001). In doing so, the court
pointed out that “there is a difference between the extent that a school may
regulate student speech in a public university setting as opposed to that of a public
elementary or high school.” DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315.
103. Id. at 316 (citing Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d
243, 260 (3d Cir. 2002)).
104. Id. at 304, 320.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 315.
107. Id. (citation omitted).
108. McCauley v. Univ. of the Virgin Is., 618 F.3d 232, 242–47 (3d Cir. 2010).
109. Id. at 250.
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student speech than public elementary or high schools.”
McCauley then articulated five factors for reaching this conclusion:
(1) the different “pedagogical goals of each institution,” (2) “the in
loco parentis role of public elementary and high school
administrators,” (3) the discipline needs of public elementary and
high schools, (4) student maturity, and (5) the fact that many
university students live on campus and are continually subject to
111
university rules.
E. Tatro Fails to Recognize Crucial Distinctions Between Speech
Protections at Primary and University Levels
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, did not appear to
see the distinctions between university and primary and secondary
students as critical. The court was unconcerned about whether the
Tinker substantial-disruption test should apply in a university
112
The court noted that it could “discern no practical
setting.
reasons for such a distinction” and simply observed that other
lower courts have applied the Tinker standard to public
113
The court ceded that what comprises a substantial
universities.
disruption “in a primary school may look very different in a
university. But these differences do not per se remove the Tinker
114
line of cases from the analysis.”
115
Without further consideration, the court applied Tinker. But
its own explicit acknowledgment of the differences between the
institutions should have entered, if not altered, its analysis.
Nevertheless, it did not. The court failed to consider how a
substantial disruption might look different on a college campus
than in a high school classroom. It failed to touch on why caution
would be prudent in applying Tinker and how the pedagogical goals

110. Id. at 247 (citing DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 316). The court continued:
At a minimum, the teachings of Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, Morse, and other
decisions involving speech in public elementary and high schools, cannot
be taken as gospel in cases involving public universities. Any application
of free speech doctrine derived from these decisions to the university
setting should be scrutinized carefully, with an emphasis on the
underlying reasoning of the rule to be applied.
Id.
111. Id. at 242–43.
112. See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
113. Id.
114. Id. (citation omitted).
115. Id.
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of high schools and colleges are extraordinarily different.
Instead, in a reflexive manner, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
applied the Tinker standard, a standard that is rarely used on
college students in such an exacting manner. Although it upheld
DeJohn, the court regrettably did not follow the spirit of the Third
Circuit’s jurisprudence. It ignored McCauley outright. It did not
afford university leaders less leeway when they disciplined Tatro for
her speech. Rather, it allowed them to sanction her off-campus
speech under a standard other courts likely would have been
reluctant to apply to junior high students blogging in class.
V. ONLINE SPEECH LIKE TATRO’S IS PROTECTED SPEECH
A. U.S. Supreme Court Has Not Ruled on Student Internet Speech Rights
Even if the Tinker standard were found to carry over to
university speech, it should not apply to off-campus speech like
Tatro’s. Nowhere in its student-speech cases has the Supreme
Court expressly authorized the restriction of off-campus speech.
Whether speech is on campus or off, therefore, becomes a
116
threshold question in determining whether it is protected.
Moreover, signals from the Court support the proposition that
students can be sanctioned only for speech that occurs on campus.
The Court in Morse emphasized that, if the sanctioned speech in
117
question had occurred off campus, it would have been protected.
Although Morse did involve the sanctioning of speech that was
118
technically off campus, it notably occurred during a school event.
In writing for the majority in Morse, Chief Justice Roberts stated
that the speech restriction applied off campus because the student
119
He referred to the Court’s
was at a school-sponsored event.
decision in Bethel, noting that “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same
speech in a public forum outside the school context, [he] would
120
Likewise, Justice Brennan’s Bethel
have been protected.”
concurrence stated that “[i]f respondent had given the same
116. When courts have allowed the restriction of students’ off-campus speech,
it typically is in the context of speech that is directed at the school and brought on
campus. See LaVine ex rel. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 991–92 (9th
Cir. 2001) (upholding expulsion of a student who brought a poem he wrote at
home about shooting fellow students to school and showed his English teacher).
117. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 394 (2007).
118. Id. at 400–01.
119. Id. at 401.
120. Id. at 405 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
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speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been
penalized simply because government officials considered his
121
language to be inappropriate.”
The very premise of Tinker—that students do not shed their
First Amendment right to free speech at the “schoolhouse
122
gate” —indicates that the restrictions at stake occur at school.
Outside of school, students’ First Amendment rights should be
123
firmly in place. The modern inquiry has become whether school
officials can extend their authority from the schoolhouse gate to
students’ online activity, much of which is done at home, on their
own phones and computers.
The Court has never decided an Internet speech case, so it has
not delineated whether online activity amounts to on- or offcampus activity.
However, the absence of Supreme Court
precedent over the extension of First Amendment protections to
student cyberspeech has not slowed the volume of cases addressing
the issue. Particularly in 2011, there was a flurry of circuit decisions
124
around the off-campus nature of student cyberspeech.
B. Recent Case Law Concludes Online, Off-Campus Speech is Protected
The Tatro court wrongly applied the Tinker analysis to Tatro’s
online, off-campus posts. The court held that the university did not
violate Tatro’s free-speech rights because her online posts fell
125
within the confines of the university’s Student Conduct Code.
121. 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Cohen, 403
U.S. at 15).
122. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
123. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044–45 (2d Cir. 1979). The
Thomas court stated:
[O]ur willingness to defer to the schoolmaster’s expertise in
administering school discipline rests, in large measure, upon the
supposition that the arm of authority does not reach beyond the
schoolhouse gate. When an educator seeks to extend his dominion
beyond these bounds, therefore, he must answer to the same
constitutional commands that bind all other institutions of government.
Id.
124. The circuit rulings regarding online student speech released in 2011
include Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); J.S. ex rel.
Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc);
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc); D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Public School District, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir.
2011); and Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
125. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). The
Code of Conduct covers off-campus activity that “adversely affects a substantial
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Nowhere in its decision did the court acknowledge that there was
even the hint of a question in applying Tinker to off-campus speech.
But a growing body of federal case law supports the proposition
that high school students’ online posts, published off-campus, are
126
protected speech.
Two similar, but separate, Third Circuit cases, both decided en
banc with opinions simultaneously issued one month before Tatro,
clearly prevent school officials from disciplining students based on
online, off-campus speech. In Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage
School District, the appeals court unanimously held that a high
school could not punish a student for online speech merely
127
And in
because the speech was vulgar and reached the school.
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, the Third Circuit, in
an 8-6 decision, noted that the Supreme Court has never allowed
“schools to punish students for off-campus speech that is not
school-sponsored or at a school-sponsored event and that caused
128
To do so would
no substantial disruption at school.”
“significantly broaden school districts’ authority over student
speech and would vest school officials with dangerously overbroad
129
censorship discretion.”
The Third Circuit in Blue Mountain held that a Pennsylvania
student who mocked her principal on Myspace could not be
disciplined because the speech did not cause a material disruption
of school activities and “could not reasonably have led school
130
The court further
officials to forecast substantial disruption.”
held that a student’s speech that originally was made off campus
did not become on-campus speech when another student brought

University interest and . . . indicates that the student may present a danger or
threat to the health or safety of the student or others.” Id.
126. See, e.g., Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d 915; Layshock, 650 F.3d 205; T.V. ex rel.
B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:09-CV-290-PPS, 2011 WL 3501698
(N.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2011); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010);
Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Emmett v.
Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
127. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207.
128. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 933. In 2010, two three-judge panels of the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued conflicting decisions in Layshock and Blue
Mountain, which present similar facts and issues. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue
Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010). Due to the inconsistencies, the
Third Circuit vacated the rulings and re-heard the cases en banc in 2011.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 920.
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131

a copy of it to school.
The school district could not punish the
student for use of profane language outside the school, during
132
non-school hours. While the majority opinion expressly left open
the question of whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech in the
first place, five judges signed on to a concurrence that opined that
133
Judge Smith wrote, “[T]he First Amendment
it does not.
protects students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent
134
it protects speech by citizens in the community at large.”
The Third Circuit also overruled the district court’s
contention that even if the speech was not a material and
substantial disruption under Tinker, it was still prohibited speech
135
The school district had argued its
under the Fraser exception.
discipline was justified because the speech “was lewd, vulgar, and
offensive [and] had an effect on the school and the educational
136
But the Third Circuit concluded that
mission of the District.”
Fraser did not apply to off-campus speech:
Under these circumstances, to apply the Fraser standard to
justify the School District’s punishment of J.S.’s speech
would be to adopt a rule that allows school officials to
punish any speech by a student that takes place anywhere,
at any time, as long as it is about the school or a school
official, is brought to the attention of a school official, and
137
is deemed “offensive” by the prevailing authority.
Layshock, the other Third Circuit case, also involved a Myspace
parody of a principal. Again, the court held that a school district
did not have authority to punish a student for expressive conduct
138
outside of school that the district considered lewd and offensive.
The student, Pennsylvania high school senior Justin Layshock,
131. Id. at 932.
132. Id. The eighth-grade student (J.S.) and her friend used her home
computer to create a Myspace profile making fun of her principal. Id. at 920. The
fake profile contained profane attacks and “sexually explicit content.” Id. The day
it was posted, it could be viewed by anyone who knew the URL or who was
searching Myspace. Id. at 921. The students made it “private” the next day,
limiting access to only people they had “friended” on the site. Id. The principal
requested that another student bring in a printout of the profile. Id. After the
principal obtained a copy of the profile, he suspended J.S. for ten days. Id. at 922.
133. Id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 932 (majority opinion).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 933.
138. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d
Cir. 2011).
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along with three other students, created an offensive bogus profile
139
When
that mocked and degraded the school’s principal.
Layshock allowed other students to view the profile, word of it
140
“spread like wildfire” among the students at Hickory High.
Layshock was suspended for ten days, placed in an alternative high
school, banned from all extracurricular activities, and prevented
141
from attending his graduation ceremony.
The court determined that although Layshock had cut and
pasted a picture of the principal from the school’s web site, that
action alone did not create a sufficient nexus between the school
142
The relationship between his conduct
and the online profile.
and the school was too attenuated, and Layshock could not be
143
punished simply because the speech reached inside the school.
The Fifth Circuit also has protected student speech made off
campus. In Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board, the court upheld
summary judgment for a school principal based on the defense of
144
but determined that a student’s violent
qualified immunity,
sketch, drawn two years earlier and accidentally brought to school
145
by his little brother, was protected speech.
An Indiana district court judge expressly followed Layshock and
Blue Mountain in August 2011, holding that school administrators
exceeded their authority when they disciplined high school girls
who posed for sexually suggestive pictures and posted them online
146
The girls did not bring the
during a summer sleepover party.
139. Id. at 207–08.
140. Id. at 208.
141. Id. at 210.
142. Id. at 215–16.
143. Id. at 216. The court made clear what was at stake:
It would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in
the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s home and control
his/her actions there to the same extent that it can control that child
when he/she participates in school sponsored activities. Allowing the
District to punish Justin for conduct he engaged in while at his
grandmother’s house using his grandmother’s computer would create
just such a precedent, and we therefore conclude that the district court
correctly ruled that the District’s response to Justin’s expressive conduct
violated the First Amendment guarantee of free expression.
Id.
144. The defense of qualified immunity shields school officials from liability
for civil damages when their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” See
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
145. 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004).
146. T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:09-CV-290-PPS,
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images to school, and all the activity took place off campus. The
court in T.V. ex rel. v. Smith-Green Community School Corp. stated that
the district’s contention—that the photographs were not entitled to
First Amendment protection because they were lewd and vulgar
under Fraser—”fails at the outset[,]” because the case does not
147
apply to off-campus speech.
Federal case law protecting online speech has been wideranging in recent years. In the 2010 case of Evans v. Bayer, a federal
magistrate judge ruled that a Florida high school student’s
148
In Emmett v.
Facebook posts were off-campus, protected speech.
Kent School District No. 415, the court granted a preliminary
injunction to prevent the five-day suspension of a high school
student who created a mock “obituaries” site from his home
149
In addition to the satirical obituaries written about
computer.
two of his friends, the site allowed visitors to vote on who would
150
“die” next and become the subject of the subsequent obituary.
The court found that school officials presented no evidence that
the web site “intended to threaten anyone, did actually threaten
151
anyone, or manifested any violent tendencies whatsoever.”
In Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks School District, a district court
determined that the disciplinary action taken against a high school
student for posting Internet messages on an online message board
152
The student posted three messages from
was unconstitutional.
2011 WL 3501698 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2011). The teenage plaintiffs, T.V. and
M.K., posted suggestive pictures of themselves with phallic-shaped lollipops and
added vulgar captions to the photos. The photographs were taken and posted at
home onto Myspace and Facebook accounts, where they were generally available
to students who had been granted “Friend” status. Id. at *2. Another student’s
mother brought printouts of the pictures to the district superintendent, reporting
that the photos were causing “divisiveness” among students on the girls’ volleyball
teams. Id. The girls ultimately were suspended from extracurricular activities for a
portion of the year. Id. at *3.
147. Id. at *9. In granting summary judgment to the teenage plaintiffs, Chief
Judge Simon wisely noted that “[n]ot much good takes place at slumber parties for
high school kids, and this case proves the point.” Id. at *1.
148. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010). The court in Evans denied the
district’s motion to dismiss, determining that officials who disciplined student
Katherine Evans after she created a Facebook group aimed at criticizing a teacher,
violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. The page was created
off-campus, did not occur at a school-sponsored activity, and was not accessed at
school. Id. at 1372. Therefore, the connection to campus was too attenuated. Id.
149. 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090–91 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
150. Id. at 1089.
151. Id. at 1090.
152. 247 F. Supp. 2d 698 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
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153

his parents’ home and one from school.
The student handbook
prohibited speech that was abusive, harassment, inappropriate, and
offensive, but did not geographically limit the school’s authority to
154
The court found that the handbook policies
discipline speech.
were constitutionally overbroad because they were not linked to
155
The court
speech that substantially disrupted school operations.
also determined that the policies were overbroad since they could
be read to cover speech that occurred off the school’s campus and
156
that was not school related.
The issue of whether school officials have legal authority to
regulate student cyberspeech is far from settled. However, the
most recent case law suggests that much of students’ online speech
is clearly protected, particularly when it was not directed at campus,
not accessed on campus, and caused no substantial disruption of
157
educational activities on campus.
C. Cases That Have Upheld Restrictions of Online Speech are Inapposite
to Tatro
The courts are divided on several important legal questions
about online speech that is created off campus, including whether
school officials have more authority to regulate online speech if it
links to the school’s web site and is aimed directly at the school’s
158
A key case that stands for the proposition that it
audience.
matters to whom the online speech is aimed is J.S. ex rel. H.S. v.
Bethlehem Area School District, in which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was confronted with a web site created by a student on his
159
The site was titled “Teacher Sux” and
home computer.
“consisted of a number of web pages that made derogatory,
profane, offensive and threatening comments, primarily about the
160
The court found that the speech
student’s algebra teacher . . . .”
was on-campus because the student “facilitated the on-campus
nature of the speech by accessing the web site on a school
computer in a classroom, showing the site to another student, and
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 700.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 705–06.
See discussion infra Part V.C.
See Hudson, supra note 83.
807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
Id. at 851.
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by informing other students at school of the existence of the web
161
site.”
Following in the vein of Bethlehem, a body of case law suggests
that school officials can discipline students for online, off-campus
speech. The Minnesota Court of Appeals drew a parallel between
162
Tatro and one of these cases, but the case the court relied on is
not analogous and neither is the line of cases that have restricted
online speech. They are distinguishable from Tatro in two keys
ways. One line of cases has upheld the regulation of online speech
when the speech was targeted at the school and did in fact cause an
actual substantial disruption on campus. In the other line of cases,
the regulated speech threatened violence and could also have been
restricted under the “true-threat” doctrine. Moreover, given that
the violence threatened in those cases would have occurred on
campus if carried out, there was a reasonable argument that, as
students and staff heard about the threats, the speech would meet
Tinker’s standard.
Therefore, even if Tinker could be applied to off-campus,
online speech, it does not apply to speech that is not likely to cause
a material and substantial disruption on campus. Neither line of
cases applies to Tatro, and the appeals court wrongly made the link.
Tatro’s postings did not cause—and were not reasonably likely to
cause—a material and substantial disruption to the work and
163
Her Facebook posts could not
discipline of the university.
reasonably be construed as threatening actual violence, and any
actual disruption on campus was the result of the university’s
164
overreaction, not the expression itself.

161. Id. at 865. The court also found it significant that the “web site was aimed
not at a random audience, but at the specific audience of students and others
connected with this particular School District . . . .” Id. The court therefore held:
“[W]here speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel is brought
onto the school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech will be
considered on-campus speech.” Id.
162. The Tatro court cites Wisniewski v. Board of Education, 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.
2007). Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
163. See discussion infra Part VI.
164. See discussion infra Parts VI, VII.
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D. Online Speech Restricted Where it Targeted School and Caused Actual
Substantial Disruption
The Minnesota Court of Appeals used a 2007 Second Circuit
165
case, Wisniewski v. Board of Education, to stand for the proposition
that Tinker’s substantial-disruption standard should apply to offcampus student speech that could be “reasonably understood as
166
Applying the Tinker analysis, the court
urging violent conduct.”
in Wisniewski held that it was reasonably foreseeable that a student’s
online communication would cause a substantial disruption within
the school, and as such, the school district did not violate the
167
But the
student’s First Amendment rights by disciplining him.
Tatro comparison to Wisniewski, which involved outside messages
that threatened violence inside the school, falls short. Parents of
eighth-grader Aaron Wisniewski appealed his semester-long
suspension for sharing with multiple friends, via online instant
messages, an icon that depicted the shooting and killing of his
168
The drawings he e-mailed to
junior high English teacher.
classmates displayed a gun shooting someone in the head, dots
representing splattered blood, and the words “kill” along with the
169
The court determined it was
name of Wisniewski’s teacher.
“reasonably foreseeable” that the picture would reach the teacher
and administrators and that it would “create a risk of substantial
170
disruption.”
165. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). The Third Circuit in Blue Mountain expressly
disputed the dissenting opinion that the majority decision was creating a split with
the Second Circuit in Wisnewiski. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.,
650 F.3d 915, 931 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011). The Third Circuit noted that each case was
decided on the facts and rejected an assertion that the Second Circuit had
determined “that off-campus hostile and offensive student internet speech that is
directed at school officials results in a substantial disruption of the classroom
environment.” Id. The court wrote:
“[O]ff-campus hostile and offensive student internet speech” will not
necessarily create a material and substantial disruption at school nor will
it reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial disruption in
school. Further, the facts of the cases cited by the dissent in support of
its proposition that we have created a circuit split differ considerably
from the facts presented in this case.
Id.
166. Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 821.
167. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40.
168. Id. at 35–36.
169. Id.
170. Id. The court further stated that “[t]he fact that Aaron’s creation and
transmission of the IM icon occurred away from school property does not
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Although the investigating police officer concluded that the
drawing was meant in jest, the teacher quit teaching that class for
the remainder of the year. His position had to be replaced, and
students were taken from class and interviewed about the
171
messages. This caused an actual disruption to classroom activities
172
in a way that Tatro’s posts did not.
The Eighth Circuit was one of four circuits to issue a ruling on
restricting student cyberspeech in 2011. In August, with D.J.M. ex
rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60, it held that a
Missouri high school student’s instant messages from his home
computer to a friend about shooting his classmates did not
constitute protected speech under either a “true-threat” analysis or
173
“D.J.M.” was in the fall of his
Tinker’s substantial-disruption test.
sophomore year when he sent messages indicating that, if he could
174
get a gun, a certain named classmate “would be the first to die.”
The student he had been chatting with online brought the
175
messages to school administrators, who alerted the police. D.J.M.
was placed in juvenile detention, a psychiatric hospital, and
176
ultimately was suspended for the remainder of the school year.
His parents sued the school, alleging that the suspension violated
his First Amendment rights.
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the messages amounted to
177
True threats are not protected under the First
a true threat.
Amendment, and school administrators “reasonably feared D.J.M.
had access to a handgun and was thinking about shooting specific
178
classmates at the high school.” The Eighth Circuit did not stop at
its true-threat analysis, however, but went further and invoked
Tinker, holding that “it was reasonably foreseeable that D.J.M.’s
threats about shooting specific students in school would be brought
necessarily insulate him from school discipline.” Id. at 39.
171. Id. at 36.
172. See discussion infra Part VI.
173. 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011).
174. Id. at 758.
175. Id. at 759.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 764. The court quoted its definition of a true threat from Doe v.
Pulaski County Special School District: “a ‘statement that a reasonable recipient would
have interpreted as a serious expression of an intent to harm or cause injury to
another.’” Id. at 762 (quoting Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616,
624 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). The speaker must have intended to communicate
his statement to another, which includes a third party. Id.
178. Id. at 764.
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to the attention of school authorities and create a risk of substantial
179
The court did note
disruption within the school environment.”
that “[s]chool officials cannot constitutionally reach out to
180
But
discover, monitor, or punish any type of student speech.”
when there was a threat of a student shooting specific classmates on
campus, the off-campus messages became punishable when
181
brought on school grounds.
In another 2011 decision, the Fourth Circuit in Kowalski v.
Berkeley County Schools upheld the suspension of a high school
student who created a discussion group web page on Myspace, with
the heading “S.A.S.H.,” (apparently an acronym for “Students
Against Shay’s Herpes”) referring to a classmate who was the topic
182
Senior Kara Kowalski, who created the
of the page’s ridicule.
page and invited one hundred of her Myspace friends to join the
group on her home computer, argued that her conduct was
shielded by the First Amendment because the speech not only
183
occurred off campus, but was not school-related.
The school district contended that they could regulate offcampus behavior as long as the behavior created a foreseeable risk
of reaching the school and causing a substantial disruption to the
184
The court agreed that
work and discipline of the school.
Kowalski’s conduct met this standard, finding that the “targeted,
defamatory nature of Kowalski’s speech, aimed at a fellow
classmate,” created actual substantial disorder and disruption at
185
school.
The court found that it was foreseeable that the expression
would reach the school because students accessed the web site on
campus, and Kowalski’s conduct involved substantial disruption of
186
and interference with the work and the discipline of the school.
She used the Internet to “orchestrate a targeted attack on a
classmate, and did so in a manner that was sufficiently connected to
the school environment as to implicate the School District’s
187
But the court
recognized authority to discipline speech . . . .”
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 766.
Id. at 765.
Id.
652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id. at 567.
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also noted that there is a limit to the “scope of a high school’s
interest in the order, safety, and well-being of its students when the
188
speech at issue originates outside the schoolhouse gate.”
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals released an opinion in
2011 that sent a mixed message for student speech. In Doninger v.
Niehoff, the appeals court upheld summary judgment for a school
district, on the grounds of qualified immunity, against a claim that
the district violated a blogging high school student’s First
189
The court ruled that school administrators
Amendment rights.
did not violate “clearly established” First Amendment precedent,
either when they disciplined senior Avery Doninger for her offcampus blog or when they prevented her from wearing a “Team
190
Avery” T-shirt at a school assembly to protest the initial discipline.
The narrow ruling turned solely on qualified immunity, however,
and the court explicitly declined to address whether Doninger’s
191
free-speech rights had been violated.
Doninger was prohibited from running for class secretary after
she posted a vulgar and misleading message on an independently
operated, public blog about the supposed cancellation of a school
192
She called school
event, an annual battle-of-the-bands concert.
administrators “douche bags” on the blog and, in an e-mail,
encouraged others to contact the superintendent “to piss her off
188.

Id. at 573. The court continued:
But we need not fully define that limit here, as we are satisfied that
the nexus of Kowalski’s speech to Musselman High School’s pedagogical
interests was sufficiently strong to justify the action taken by school
officials in carrying out their role as the trustees of the student body’s
well-being.
Of course, had Kowalski created the “S.A.S.H.” group during school
hours, using a school-provided computer and Internet connection, this
case would be more clear-cut, as the question of where speech that was
transmitted by the Internet “occurred” would not come into play. To be
sure, a court could determine that speech originating outside of the
schoolhouse gate but directed at persons in school and received by and
acted on by them was in fact in-school speech. . . . We need not resolve,
however, whether this was in-school speech and therefore whether Fraser
could apply because the School District was authorized by Tinker to
discipline Kowalski, regardless of where her speech originated . . . .

Id.
189. 642 F.3d 334, 338 (2d Cir. 2011). This case is referred to as Doninger III.
The Second Circuit upheld a 2007 district court decision that denied the plaintiff
student’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 43
(2d Cir. 2008).
190. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 346, 351.
191. Id.
192. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45.
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193

more.”
After she was banned from running for class office, and
others started a write-in campaign for her, she contemplated but
was prohibited from wearing a “Team Avery” t-shirt during a school
194
assembly.
Doninger argued that her First Amendment rights were so
clearly established that no reasonable jury could conclude
195
The court did not determine that the post had
otherwise.
necessarily caused the requisite substantial disruption to school
activities, and it did not rule on whether her First Amendment
196
rights had been violated. It noted that “the controversy over [the
battle-of-the-bands concert’s] scheduling had already resulted in a
deluge of phone calls and emails, several disrupted schedules, and
many upset students even before Doninger posted her
197
But the court determined that First
comments . . . .”
Amendment law is so muddled and difficult that even “lawyers, law
198
If
professors, and judges” are unclear what standards apply.
those in the legal profession have difficulty reconciling studentspeech protections, the court reasoned, then school administrators
should not be held personally liable under such circumstances
when a reasonable jury could find that they got it wrong.
The fact that the Second Circuit refused to decide whether
Doninger’s First Amendment rights were violated appears to be an
indication that the court was not willing to extend jurisdiction over
online speech that far. The Doninger case exemplifies off-campus,
online conduct that was far more direct and targeted than Tatro’s.
The facts suggest more strongly that an actual material disruption
happened on campus, and Doninger’s conduct clearly was aimed at
the school. But the court still declined to find that her speech was
unprotected.
Tatro did not intend for her speech to reach the school. Her
Facebook settings were configured so that only her friends and
their friends could view her posts (a number admittedly in the
199
Many of the lower courts have held that schools
hundreds).
193. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 340–41.
194. Id. at 343.
195. Id. at 346.
196. Id. at 348–49.
197. Id. at 349.
198. Id. at 353. The court continued, “The relevant Supreme Court cases can
be hard to reconcile, and courts often struggle to determine which standard
applies in any particular case.” Id.
199. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
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cannot discipline students for online speech unless it has a “nexus
200
Courts have used varied approaches in
with the school.”
201
In Blue Mountain, for
determining what comprises this nexus.
instance, the court found it significant that the student (like Tatro)
did not intend for her off-campus speech to reach the school—”in
fact, she took specific steps to make the profile ‘private’ so that only
202
her friends could access it.”
If there is a rule then that can be discerned from the multiple
and seemingly disparate circuit decisions, it is that for online
speech to be considered within a school’s jurisdiction, it must be
(1) directed at the school, (2) threatening, and (3) likely to cause a
substantial disruption to educational activities on campus. Layshock
and Blue Mountain clearly stand for the principle that students
cannot be punished for online speech, created outside of school,
that fails to cause a substantial and material disruption on
203
campus. In the rulings that upheld restrictions of online speech,
as in Weisnewski, the threatening behavior directed at the school
caused a material and substantial disruption to classroom activities.
Tatro’s speech was far more satirical than it was threatening, and
the expression itself was not what caused a material and substantial
disruption on campus, if there was one at all.
VI. TATRO’S SPEECH DID NOT CAUSE A MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL
DISRUPTION
A. University Overreaction Caused Disruption, If There Was One, Not
Tatro’s Speech
Assuming, arguendo, that the K-12 Tinker standard should
apply to university students and that it also should carry over to offcampus, online speech, Tatro’s posts still should be protected
under the First Amendment. Even if the Tinker standard were the
proper one, the standard has not been met in this case. Under
Tinker, a school may regulate student speech that creates a material
and substantial disruption to the school’s work or discipline, or
where school officials could reasonably “forecast substantial
200. See 1 RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE
PROCESS AND DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 2:26 (2011).
201. Id.
202. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d Cir.
2011).
203. See supra notes 127–143 and discussion.
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disruption of or material interference with school activities.”
There simply is no evidence to suggest that Tatro’s posts caused
such a disruption to the university—or that school officials could
have reasonably predicted that it would.
Furthermore, if there was such a disruption to school activities,
it occurred as a result of the overreaction of university
administrators to the Facebook posts. School officials cannot
bootstrap the limited exceptions to the protection of the First
Amendment into restricting speech they find unpleasant or
uncomfortable. This type of bootstrapping, however, is exactly
what happened in Tatro. After a single student complained about
the Facebook post, the department head contacted the university
police, who investigated and determined that there was no real
205
The posts themselves appear obviously
threat of violence.
satirical, even if in poor humor and lacking sensitivity to the
families of the cadaver donors. No facts amount to a material and
substantial disruption. Rather, the disruption the administration
and the court seemed most concerned about is that Tatro’s posts
“presented substantial concerns about the integrity of the anatomy206
This is because donors and funeral directors
bequest program.”
eventually contacted the university about Tatro’s conduct and the
207
If this disruption does indeed
professionalism of the program.
qualify as substantial under Tinker, it was the result of the
university’s reaction and subsequent media attention, not Tatro’s
expression itself.
B. Any Disruption on Campus Did Not Rise to Requisite Level
A wide body of school-speech jurisprudence supports the
proposition that facts like those in Tatro do not give rise to a
substantial disruption of the work and discipline of the school. In
Tinker, when students “neither interrupted school activities nor
sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others . . .
[and] caused discussion outside of the classrooms, but no
204. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
205. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
206. Id. at 822.
207. Minnesota media reported on the University of Minnesota’s discipline of
Tatro. See, e.g., Jenna Ross, Student Banned from U After Facebook Posts, STARTRIBUNE
(Dec. 15, 2009, 11:23 PM), http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis
/79361082.html. Local media outlets have also covered Tatro’s appeals. See, e.g.,
Jane Pribek, U of M Action Upheld in Facebook Incident, MINN. LAW., July 18, 2011, at
2.
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interference with work and no disorder . . . [the] Constitution does
208
not permit officials of the State to deny their form of expression.”
Courts have repeatedly emphasized that the “mere desire to avoid
‘discomfort’ or ‘unpleasantness’ is not enough to justify restricting
209
student speech under Tinker.”
In Blue Mountain, for instance, school officials claimed that the
mock online profile disrupted school because there were general
210
More than twenty students viewed the
“rumblings” regarding it.
Myspace parody online, students talked about it in class, and staff
211
had to adjust their schedules to meet with J.S. and her parents.
However, the Third Circuit found that none of this amounted to a
212
The court further noted that it was the
material disruption.
principal’s response to the parody that “exacerbated rather than
213
contained the disruption in the school.”
Similarly, in the case of the high school students who posted
racy photos of themselves online, the court held that any “actual
disruption” caused by the photographs “does not come close” to
214
The court found that the acts of
meeting the Tinker standard.
officials responding to two complaints from parents on the girls’
volleyball team and students sniping at one another amounted only
215
Likewise, a California district
to “unremarkable dissension.”
court determined that a YouTube video, in which students made
208. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
209. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2001)
(quoting West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000));
see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970
(5th Cir. 1972) (holding that a school board could not discipline students for the
distribution of an off-campus newspaper where “[a]s a factual matter there were
no disruptions of class; there were no disturbances of any sort, on or off campus”).
The court refused to rule on the remaining threshold question of whether the
Tinker standard could ever apply to off-campus conduct, however. Shanley, 462 F.2d
at 974.
210. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 922 (3d Cir.
2011).
211. Id. at 922–23.
212. Id. at 928.
213. Id. at 931. But cf. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007)
(holding that punishment was justified, under the Tinker standard, where students
circulated a petition to fellow football players calling for the ouster of their
football coach, causing the school to have to call a team meeting to ensure “team
unity,” and “eroding [the coach’s] authority and dividing players into opposing
camps”).
214. T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:09-CV-290-PPS,
2011 WL 3501698, at *12 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2011).
215. Id. at *13.
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“derogatory, sexual, and defamatory” statements about a thirteenyear-old classmate, did not rise to the level of a substantial
216
On summary judgment, the
disruption of classroom activities.
court found that five students missing some part of class, an angry
parent calling, and one student who would not go to class was not
217
enough. “The mere ‘buzz’ about the profile, standing alone, was
218
not sufficient under Tinker to constitute a substantial disruption.”
Even in instances where the speech at issue originated off
campus but was brought on campus, courts have reaffirmed that
disliking the speech is not enough to justify its restriction under
Tinker. In Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, a student was
suspended after he created a vulgar and derogatory “top ten” list
about the high school athletic director and e-mailed it to other
219
In granting summary
students from his home computer.
judgment to the student, the district court held that the school
220
district failed to “adduce any evidence of actual disruption.”
“[T]he list was on school grounds for several days before the
administration became aware of its existence, and at least one week
221
The
passed before the [administration] took any action.”
speech, although upsetting, was not threatening and “did not cause
222
any faculty member to take a leave of absence.” The court noted
that although the coach was upset and had a hard time doing his
job and that a librarian “was almost in tears,” the events did not rise
223
to the level of a substantial disruption.
As these high school speech cases make clear, speech that
causes a substantial disruption must be more than an irritant or an
embarrassment. Even where the speech is threatening, courts have
216. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094,
1108, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010). The fact that the conduct occurred outside of school
did not prevent that school from disciplining the plaintiff student for such
conduct, especially because it was reasonably foreseeable that the video made by
the student would find its way to campus. Id. at 1107–08. Although the court held
that Tinker applies to both on- and off-campus speech, the court found that there
was no substantial disruption of school activities and no reasonably foreseeable
risk of substantial disruption of school activities as a result of the video. Id. at
1117. Discipline of the student thus violated the First Amendment regardless of
where the speech took place. Id. at 1122–23.
217. Id. at 1117–-19.
218. Id. at 1112.
219. 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
220. Id. at 455.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 455–56.
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determined that there must be a specific, imminent threat directed
at an individual on campus for there to be a substantial disruption.
In Murakowski v. University of Delaware, for instance, although the
court improperly used Tinker’s substantial disruption test to analyze
the speech of a university student who posted violent writings
against women and homosexuals, it found that the student’s speech
224
could not be sanctioned.
Maciej Murakowski, a nineteen-year-old student at the
University of Delaware, created a website in 2005 on the university’s
servers that included violent, sexually explicit material, including
225
A fellow female
musings on the rape and torture of women.
student, who lived in Murakowski’s residence hall, “manifested
both verbally and by her appearance abject terror of Murakowski
and fear for her safety to the point that she had to change her
academic schedule. She also sought counseling. The brother of a
female student complained to University police about
226
227
Another parent also complained.
But
Murakowski’s essays.”
these community and student concerns were not enough for the
court: “Although complete chaos is not required, something more
than distraction or discomfiture created by the speech is
228
The court determined that the university did not
needed.”
present evidence “which reasonably led it to forecast material
229
And the
interference with campus education and activities.”
university also did not show that the student’s writings “were
intentionally aimed at disrupting the college environment and
230
actually materially did so in a concrete fashion.”
The speech itself must cause or be reasonably likely to cause a
substantial and material disruption within the school environment,
not simply an inconvenience or worry for school officials.
Therefore, Tatro’s Facebook posts simply do not meet this
standard. They did not create a substantial disruption. Classes did
not stop. Teachers continued to teach. The facts do not indicate
any sort of wide-ranging concern among the student body. One
224. Murakowski v. Univ. of Del., 575 F. Supp. 2d 571, 592 (D. Del. 2008).
225. Id. at 576–78. Murakowski wrote, among other things, a how-to guide
depicting how he would go about kidnapping, raping, torturing, killing, and then
disposing of women’s bodies. Id.
226. Id. at 591.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 592.
230. Id.
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student came forward to complain about the posting, which Tatro
had not directed at the school in any way. Police determined there
was not a real threat. Had the university not overreacted to the
posts, none of the disruption would have happened. It is
disingenuous, circular logic to lay blame for any disruption on the
student speech, when it was the reaction to the student speech that
caused the disruption.
VII. TRUE-THREAT STANDARD MORE APPLICABLE THAN TINKER IN
EVALUATING TATRO
A. Adult Speech Should Be Evaluated Under a Higher Standard
The University of Minnesota’s discipline of Tatro was
inappropriate under the Tinker standard. As an attempt to punish
Tatro for the content of her speech, the university’s disciplinary
measures were content-based speech restrictions, which are
protected under the First Amendment unless an exception applies.
As discussed, Tinker and the Court’s subsequent decisions define an
exception for K-12 students who are on campus or at a school
event, and whose speech is likely to cause a material and substantial
disruption, is lewd or offensive, or is in opposition to the school’s
educational mission. Tatro v. University of Minnesota does not fall
within these exceptions.
A more appropriate First Amendment exception from which
to analyze Tatro’s speech is the “true-threat” doctrine. While the
First Amendment protects nearly all adult speech, it does not
provide an absolute shield. One exception, for instance, is for a
true threat. Speech that constitutes a “true threat” is not entitled to
First Amendment protection under the Court’s holding in the 1969
231
Thirty-four years later, in Virginia v.
case of Watts v. United States.
Black, the Court held that “‘true threats’ . . . encompass those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
231. 394 U.S. 705 (1969). In 1966, a protestor on the Washington Monument
grounds, in opposition to the draft, said that he wanted to get his sights on the
President of the United States if the government forced him to carry a rifle. Id. at
706. He was charged and convicted for violating a federal law that prohibited
threats against the president. Id. But the Court found that his words amounted to
political hyperbole and were not true threats within the statutory meaning. Id. at
708. The Court held that speech loses the protection of the First Amendment
when the government proves that it constitutes a “true ‘threat.’” Id.
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232

B. True Threats Must be Understood by Reasonable Person as Expressing
Violent Intent
While Watts made it clear that true threats are not protected
speech, the Court arguably has not adopted a clear standard to
233
The
determine when caustic or violent speech is a true threat.
question that courts have struggled with is determining the level of
intent necessary for the speech to be considered a true threat.
Although Black suggests a subjective standard of intent, the federal
circuit courts have split as to what speech constitutes a true threat.
As First Amendment scholar David Hudson notes, some courts have
234
determined that a speaker must intend to threaten someone.
“This doesn’t mean that the speaker must actually intend to carry
out the threat. It does mean, however, that the speaker must
subjectively intend that his or her comments be interpreted as a
235
But other courts have required only that the
true threat.”
236
speaker “knowingly intended” to communicate to someone.
“These courts do not require that it be proven that the speaker
subjectively intended to threaten someone. Rather, they focus on
whether there was an intent to communicate and whether an
objective or reasonable recipient would regard it as a serious
237
expression of harm.”
232. 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (internal citation omitted). In Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion, she also wrote that a “prohibition on true threats
protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear
engenders, in addition to protecting people from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur.” Id. at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alteration in original).
233. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation,
and Free Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1294 (2005) (analyzing several layers
of conflicting messages in Virginia v. Black); Paul T. Crane, Note, ‘True Threats’ and
the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1244–48 (2006) (discussing how lower courts
have interpreted true threats under Virginia v. Black).
234. David L. Hudson Jr., True Threats, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (June 1,
2010), http://www.firstamendmentcentral.org/Speech/personal/topic.aspx?topic
=true_threats.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. The Ninth Circuit applied the subjective-intent test in United States v.
Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 633 (9th Cir. 2005), while the Fifth Circuit applied the
objective recipient test in Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board, 393 F.3d 608, 616
(5th Cir. 2004). In addition, in United States v. Dinwiddie the Eighth Circuit
identified five factors to analyze in determining whether speech is a true threat.
76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996). The Dinwiddie factors are (1) “whether the threat
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In the Eighth Circuit, the test for distinguishing a true threat
from constitutionally protected speech is whether an objectively
reasonable recipient would interpret the threat “as a serious
238
expression of an intent to harm or cause injury to another.” This
rule stems from the 2002 case Doe v. Pulaski County Special School
District where the Eighth Circuit ruled that a student’s violent, off239
In Pulaski, an eighth grade
campus speech was not protected.
student, “J.M.,” was expelled for writing two letters describing how
he planned to rape and murder a classmate who had broken up
240
with him. He kept the letters at home and never delivered them
241
to his ex-girlfriend, but she found out about them nonetheless.
The court ruled that J.M.’s free-speech rights were not violated
because the letters were true threats. The court concluded that
“J.M. intended to communicate the letter and is therefore
accountable if a reasonable recipient would have viewed the letter
242
This element “is satisfied if the speaker
as a threat.”
communicates the statement to the object of the purported threat
243
or to a third party.”
Pulaski is not the only instance of a court applying a true-threat
244
In
analysis to school speech that is perceived as threatening.
Hannibal, the Eighth Circuit held that a high school student’s
instant messages about shooting his classmates were not protected
was conditional,” (2) the reaction of the listeners, (3) “whether the threat was
communicated directly to its victim,” (4) “whether the maker of the threat had
made similar statements to the victim in the past,” and (5) “whether the victim had
reason to believe that the maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in
violence.” Id.
238. Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 624 (8th Cir. 2002)
(en banc).
239. Id. at 619; see also Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 958, 963–64 (8th Cir.
2008) (applying Pulaski and a true-threat analysis in holding that a decision to
place a high school student who wrote a “fantasy murder-suicide” in protective
custody did not violate his First Amendment rights).
240. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 619.
241. Id. at 619–20.
242. Id. at 624.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371
(9th Cir. 1996). The court upheld, on true-threat grounds, the discipline of a
high school student who said she would shoot a school counselor, declining to
apply Tinker because threatening conduct is not protected, regardless of whether
or not it happened at school. Id. Other courts have declined to apply a truethreat analysis. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d. 34, 38–39 (2d Cir.
2007) (applying Tinker to analyze a student’s speech and rejecting Pulaski, stating
that “school officials have significantly broader authority to sanction student
speech” than the true-threat standard allows).
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245

under Tinker or a true-threat standard. The court found that the
speech constituted a true threat because (1) the teen intentionally
communicated his threats to a third party; (2) his speech could be
reasonably understood as a true threat (taken in the context of his
depression, access to weapons, and statement that he wanted
Hannibal “to be known for something”); and (3) his statements
246
were sufficiently serious.
Under both the subjective and objective tests—which analyze
the speaker’s intent—the speech must be understood by a
reasonable person as expressing an intent to commit violence in
247
Therefore, the belief that there
order to qualify as a true threat.
is an actual threat must be reasonable within the context it was
made.
C. Tatro’s Speech Does Not Qualify as a True Threat
Although other courts have employed a true-threat analysis,
Tatro sidestepped it. The Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that
most courts have held that “student expression need not reach the
true-threat threshold before a public school may take appropriate
disciplinary action in the interest of protecting the work and safety
248
This rule acknowledges that it is possible for
of its community.”
speech to cause a substantial disruption under Tinker, but not rise
to the level of a true threat. The fact that the true-threat doctrine
presents a higher barrier to restricting speech is exactly why it
should provide the basis for analyzing university speech. Applying
a true-threat analysis to the speech of an adult student at a public
university is more appropriate than applying Tinker, particularly
when the speech in question was off campus.
Arguably, the court did not undertake a true-threat analysis
because Tatro’s speech clearly did not constitute a true threat.
While the true-threat doctrine would have been a better starting
point for the court’s analysis of her speech, Tatro nevertheless
should not have been disciplined under it. In Murakowski v.
University of Delaware, for instance, even where a university student
posted graphic and violent acts—including rape, kidnap, and
murder—on a web site he created on the school’s server, a court
245. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 754, 765–66 (8th
Cir. 2011); see id. at 762–64.
246. Id. at 762–64.
247. See State v. Cook, 947 A.2d 307, 315 (Conn. 2008).
248. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
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249

held that his acts did not amount to true threats.
The court
found that while the student’s comments “clearly impl[y] an
interest in raping and/or murdering women,” they did not
250
Although many of his postings were
“constitute a true threat.”
directed to women as a whole, they were not directed at “specific
individuals, a particular group[,] or even to women on the
251
Furthermore, while at least one female
University’s campus.”
student (who lived in the same dormitory) was frightened, others
did not take the student’s rants seriously, and a doctor found that
252
while they were indeed offensive, they did not pose a threat.
Similarly, the University of Minnesota police determined that
Tatro’s Facebook posts about wanting to stab a “certain someone”
253
But in bypassing
and having a “Death List” were not criminal.
the issue, the court nullified the findings of the police
investigation. While one faculty member was frightened by the
posts, there was no rational basis for this fear. Tatro had neither a
propensity for nor a history of violence. She did not identify whom
she wanted to harm in the posts, for which the audience was her
friends and family who presumably understood her dark sense of
humor. There was no context that would lead a reasonable person
to believe that there was a serious basis for the conclusion that the
online posts were truly threatening.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A. Offensive Speech is Protected Speech
Tatro’s posts on Facebook were inappropriate, in bad taste,
and most certainly offended the families who had bequeathed
cadavers to the University of Minnesota’s mortuary-science
program. But the posts, however offensive, were protected speech.
A hallmark of the First Amendment is that speech does not lose its
protection merely for offense and discomfiture. The standard
remains that all speech is protected unless its content falls within
an exception that removes free-speech safeguards. And in this
case, Tatro’s Facebook posts did not fall within such an exception.
They were neither a true threat nor a substantial disruption to the
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

575 F. Supp. 2d 571, 590–91 (D. Del. 2008).
Id. at 590.
Id.
Id. at 580, 582, 591.
Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 816, 822.
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university’s classes or other educational endeavors. The basis,
therefore, used by the Minnesota Court of Appeals to uphold the
university’s sanctioning is an unconstitutional extension of
exceptions to the First Amendment.
Tatro argued that the Facebook posts, “when read in context,
were obviously literary expression, intended to be satirical, vent
254
This is a
emotion, and incorporate popular culture references.”
highly reasonable explanation, particularly given the fact that she
was a mortuary-science student with an acknowledged “sarcastic”
255
She had never handled or used a
and “morbid sense of humor.”
256
The
trocar before posting on Facebook about this instrument.
teacher of the lab class in which a trocar would be used said she
had never seen Tatro do or say anything threatening, considered
her a good student, and did not ask her for an explanation about
257
The posts did not amount to a “serious
the Facebook posts.
258
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence” as
required under the true-threat doctrine.
It appears, based on the unsavory facts of this case, that the
Minnesota Court of Appeals was looking for a way to uphold
Tatro’s discipline. Since it could not do so using the standard
appropriate for adult speech, the true-threat standard, it simply
rejected its use. The court instead chose a standard set forth by
Tinker and its progeny, which traditionally has been applied to far
younger students.
The Tinker standard simply does not fit. First, it ignores the
crucial difference between the relatively limited First Amendment
rights of high school students and the more vigorous rights of
college students. In addition, online speech is off-campus speech,
particularly when the nexus between the speech and the campus is
attenuated, and the speech contains no direct threats aimed at the
school. Furthermore, critically, her speech did not create a
material and substantial disruption on campus. There may have
been a low-level concern on campus, but nothing that caused a
disruption of school activities that would rise to the level required
under Tinker. Finally, the university’s attempt to bolster its
254. Id. at 817.
255. Relator’s Brief and Addendum at 6, Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d
811 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (No. A10-1440), 2010 WL 7131428, at *6.
256. Id. at 5.
257. Id. at 7.
258. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss4/5

42

Lindsay: Tinker Goes to College: Why High School Free-speech Standards Sho

1512

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:4

disruption claim by pointing to the phone calls it received from
alumni and donors does not hold up. This “disruption” came as a
result of media reports released after campus officials initially
overreacted and banned Tatro from campus. The university
should not be allowed to bootstrap the disruption caused by its own
overreaction to the speech onto the initial speech itself.
Staunching negative publicity, clearly an underlying concern in this
case, is not a legitimate reason to impinge on free-speech rights.
B. Implications of Tatro for Student Speech
By blithely extending the Tinker standard that governs oncampus junior high and high school speech to off-campus
university speech, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has watered
down First Amendment protections for college students. Yet the
off-campus speech of college students in particular should be held
to the same standards as that of adults in any other setting.
Furthermore, by determining that Tatro’s off-campus posts caused
a substantial disruption on campus, the appeals court came
dangerously close to establishing a zero-tolerance policy for jokes
that refer to violent behavior. Judge Bjorkman acknowledged as
much, noting that it did not matter if Tatro intended the language
to be threatening:
Whether or not Tatro intended her posts to be satire or
mere venting does not diminish the university’s
substantial interest in protecting the safety of its students
and faculty and addressing potentially threatening
conduct. Indeed, the realities of our time require that
our schools and universities be vigilant in watching for
and responding to student behavior that indicates a
259
potential for violence.
But this distinction does matter. Common sense should still
count. While there is a “fine line between ill-advised social media
rants and truly threatening posts, . . . there’s a mini-trend in court
260
One reason that the U.S.
to collapse the two categories.”
Supreme Court has required a demanding showing for speech to
be deemed a true threat is that plenty of “ambiguous language—or
even language that says nothing threatening on the surface—could
259. Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 816–17.
260. Eric Goldman, Mortuary Sciences College Student Disciplined for Threatening
Facebook Posts—Tatro v. University of Minnesota, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (July
12, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/07/mortuary_scienc.htm.
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be seen as threatening by some readers or listeners.”
Simply
because someone believes language to be threatening does not
reasonably make it so.
The court’s discussion above seemingly invites an examination
of Tatro’s conduct as a true threat. But instead, the court applied
Tinker, and in doing so, lowered the threshold for speech to cause a
substantial disruption to classroom activities.
The court’s
deference essentially granted carte blanche authority to university
officials to censor broad swaths of online postings that they
determine to be a substantial disruption.
Noted First Amendment scholar and UCLA law professor
Eugene Volokh astutely expressed concern that under the logic
espoused by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, “overly cautious
university police” could investigate blog posts that simply criticize
faculty or express support for students to be allowed to carry
262
In addition, “a student’s allegedly racist,
concealed weapons.
sexist, anti-gay, anti-Muslim, anti-Christian, anti-Israel, etc. posts
could easily create a ‘substantial disruption’ by alienating donors,
263
Indeed, if the test for
prospective clients, and the like.”
substantial disruption is whether university donors are unhappy,
this end-run around the First Amendment would greatly chill
college students’ free speech.
Universities could use this
justification to silence students’ speech that alienates donors or
other boosters, regardless of actual threats or resulting disruption.
C. Minnesota Supreme Court Should Overturn Tatro
Tatro is a rare example of a published appellate opinion that
addresses the off-campus speech rights of college students. If left
to stand, the decision is likely to have a threefold negative impact
on student speech—in its application of Tinker to a university, its
restriction of online speech, and its relaxed view of what constitutes
a substantial disruption that Tinker requires. The Tatro decision
should not be allowed to become binding precedent in Minnesota
261. Eugene Volokh, Court Upholds Discipline of University Student Based on
Speech, Citing Tinker, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 11, 2011 6:17 PM),
http://volokh.com/2011/07/11/court-upholds-discipline-of-university-studentbased-on-speech-citing-tinker/.
262. Id.
263. Id. Volokh suggests that if the Minnesota Court of Appeals had chosen to
uphold Tatro’s discipline on a contract theory—that Tatro had signed away rights
when she agreed to participate in the program and its conditions on
confidentiality and respect—the outcome would be perhaps less objectionable. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss4/5

44

Lindsay: Tinker Goes to College: Why High School Free-speech Standards Sho

1514

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:4

and persuasive jurisprudence elsewhere.
The Minnesota Supreme Court should overrule the appellate
court, on the grounds that it misapplied the Tinker standard. It
should not further dilute Tinker by extending it to off-campus,
online, college speech. The state’s highest court instead should
analyze Tatro’s speech under the more proper framework for
restricting the content of adult speech—the true-threat doctrine.
And under that doctrine, Tatro’s speech should be afforded
protection under the First Amendment because it does not rise to
the level of a true threat.
Tatro exemplifies precisely the type of speech that must be
protected. It was in poor taste and offensive—but that has never
been the test for speech that can be sanctioned. Indeed, it is the
unpopular statements that need the most protection.
The
sanctioning of Tatro’s speech was not the result of a material and
substantial disruption of on-campus educational activities. Rather,
it was brought on by school administrators’ “mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
264
Furthermore, Tatro’s Facebook posts
unpopular viewpoint.”
were made away from school and not directed at anyone at the
university. As speech continues to move online, educators will
continue to grapple with what falls under their authority and is
perceived as on-campus speech, and what does not. And while the
line undoubtedly needs to be drawn to distinguish when students’
cyberspeech may become subject to school restrictions, the speech
at issue here clearly falls on the protected side of that line.

264.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
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